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TRIAL IN ABSENTIA: RESCUING THE "PUBLIC NECESSITY"




It is a requirement of any legal system to decide its cases quickly. Very impor-
tant issues are involved in this necessity. First, punishments must be applied close
to the time of the commission of the crime for which the punishment is adminis-
tered. If the punishment serves any purpose (deterrence, rehabilitation or retribu-
tion), it makes no sense to postpone its application without a sound reason. The
sooner it is applied, the more efficient it becomes.
Second, the trial, which is the only legal way to apply a punishment, would not
function properly if the cases are decided long after the criminal conduct. Wit-
nesses tend to forget about past actions, some of them move out of the city, and
records get lost. In sum, it becomes more difficult for both the government and the
defendant to collect evidence.
Finally, if society has a legitimate interest in the resolution of criminal cases, it
is obvious that a delay in trial and punishment does not help to fortify the confi-
dence of the people in the judicial system. One way to avoid these negative conse-
quences is a trial in absentia because it helps to prevent the defendants from mani-
pulating the judicial system by deciding with their presence whether or not a case
can by tried.
Still, there are some rules to respect in order to proceed with a trial in such a
manner, and there are some practical reasons for doing so. This paper analyzes the
requisite established by the Tortora test2 that there must be a public necessity to
proceed with a trial in absentia even when the defendant has waived his right to be
present. First, it will give a brief explanation about the historical reasons for the
necessary presence of defendant at trial in common law and the current federal
regulation in criminal procedure. Next, it will explain the content of this "public
necessity" according to the Federal Courts of Appeals and the standard set up by
the Supreme Court decision in Crosby3. Finally, it will explain the necessity of the
public interest to proceed with a trial in absentia and it will highlight, in the conclu-
sion, the importance of this balancing test in order to prevent any arbitrary applica-
tion of trials in absentia by the courts.
1. J.D., University of Buenos Aires, Argentina (2000); L.L.M., University of Pittsburgh (2006); Public
Defender in Buenos Aires, Argentina.
2. United States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 1202 (2d Cir.1972).
3. Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255 (1993).
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II. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE DEFENDANT'S NECESSARY PRESENCE AT TRIAL
The notion that a person can be tried without his presence is quite shocking,
especially in an adversarial legal system such as the common law. The exigency of
the defendant's presence at his trial has historical roots, but fortunately, this ex-
igency no longer exists.
At early common law, the presence of both parties was necessary. This neces-
sity was required because the trial resembled a civil suit in which one individual
personally accused another.4 One of the most common methods by which to seek
justice was the trial by ordeal; by which the guilt or innocence of the defendant was
determined according to the water or fire test.5 Consequently, only the defendant
who was present was able to be tested.6 After the Norman Conquest in 1066, the
trial by battle replaced the former.7 The new method also required the defendant's
presence as one of the combatants.8 As time went by and the system of proof
changed, the defendant's presence became a necessity, "[t]o put his case before a
judge, vest that judge with authority and choose between trial by battle or 'suit of
witnesses'." 9 Finally, when trial by jury replaced the systems mentioned above, the
rule was retained and the presence of the defendant was still required. 10
III. CURRENT REGULATION
The Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43 establishes the principle that the
defendant must be present for trials involving felonies. There are some exceptions
though. Rule 43 11 provides:
(a) When Required. Unless this rule, Rule 5, or Rule 10 provides
otherwise, the defendant must be present at:
(1) the initial appearance, the initial arraignment, and the plea;
(2) every trial stage, including jury empanelment and the return of
the verdict; and
(3) sentencing.
4. Neil P. Cohen, Trial in Absentia Re-Examined, 40 TENN. L. REv. 155, 167 (1973).
5. Id. The defendant would have to personally subject himself to water or fire tests to determine his inno-
cence. Under the water test, the defendant would be bound and thrown into water, if he sank to the bottom he was
presumed to be innocent. Under the fire test, the defendant would walk through a fire, and any bums sustained
would be indicative of guilt.
6. Id.; James G. Starkey, Trial in Absentia, 54 N.Y. ST. B.J. 30, 30 (1982).
7. Cohen, supra note 4, at 168; Starkey, supra note 6, at 30. Trial by battle required the defendant to
wage battle against another; if he were innocent, it was assumed that God would help him win the battle.
8. Starkey, supra note 6, at 30; see also Cohen, supra note 4, at 168.
9. Cohen, supra note 4, at 168.
10. Starkey, supra note 6, at 30.
11. FED. R. CRIM. P. 43.
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(b) When Not Required. A defendant need not be present under
any of the following circumstances:
(1) Organizational Defendant. The defendant is an organization
represented by counsel who is present.
(2) Misdemeanor Offense. The offense is punishable by fine or by
imprisonment for not more than one year, or both, and with the de-
fendant's written consent, the court permits arraignment, plea, tri-
al, and sentencing to occur in the defendant's absence.
(3) Conference or Hearing on a Legal Question. The proceeding
involves only a conference or hearing on a question of law.
(4) Sentence Correction. The proceeding involves the correction or
reduction of sentence under Rule 35 or 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).
(c) Waiving Continued Presence.
(1) In General. A defendant who was initially present at trial, or
who had pleaded guilty or nolo contendere, waives the right to be
present under the following circumstances:
(A) when the defendant is voluntarily absent after the trial has be-
gun, regardless of whether the court informed the defendant of an
obligation to remain during trial;
(B) in a noncapital case, when the defendant is voluntarily absent
during sentencing; or
(C) when the court warns the defendant that it will remove the de-
fendant from the courtroom for disruptive behavior, but the defen-
dant persists in conduct that justifies removal from the courtroom.
(2) Waiver's Effect. If the defendant waives the right to be present,
the trial may proceed to completion, including the verdict's return
and sentencing, during the defendant's absence.
According to the Advisory Committee Notes, the adoption and later amend-
ments of the Federal Rule tend to reflect the case law that existed on this topic. 12
12. FED. R. CRIM. P. 43 advisory committee's notes.
Spring 2009
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IV. CASE LAW
Diaz v. United States,13 was the first non-capital case in which the Supreme
Court addressed a trial in absentia claim. In Diaz, the defendant was on bail and
voluntarily absented himself from the trial on two occasions during the testimony
of two witnesses for the government.14 The defendant consented to the trial pro-
ceeding in his absence, in the presence of his counsel, which it did.15 The Court
concluded that in non-capital cases where the accused was not in custody, his vo-
luntarily absence after the trial has begun in his presence operates as a waiver of
his right to be present, and leaves the court free to proceed with the trial as if he
were present. 1
6
The Court stated that the Constitution guarantees a defendant's right to con-
front the witnesses against him, but it, "[d]oes not guarantee an accused person
against the legitimate consequences of his own wrongful acts., 17 The Court re-
marked that it was a voluntary decision and if it had decided in a different way the
possibility of convicting a defendant would depend upon the defendant's entire
willingness to be present at the time the verdict is rendered. 18
The Supreme Court addressed the problem again in Illinois v. Allen.19 In Allen,
the accused had been removed from the courtroom because of misconduct after he
had been warned by the trial judge. 20  Following his conviction, the defendant
raised a claim based on the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause. 21 The
Court concluded that the defendant's behavior justified either his removal from the
courtroom or his total physical restraint, and it was within the judge's discretion to
do as he did.22 Under these circumstances, the defendant lost his right guaranteed
by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to be present throughout his trial.23 The
language used by the court led some law professors to talk about forfeiture rather
than a waiver of a constitutional right.24 The decision stated that it was neither
proper for the American judicial system to be treated disrespectfully, "[n]or can the
accused be permitted by his disruptive conduct indefinitely to avoid being tried on
the charges brought against him."
25
A few years later, in Taylor v. United States,26 the Supreme Court decided a
case where the defendant had been present at the morning session of his trial but
failed to return for the afternoon session and was consequently tried and convicted
13. Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912).
14. Id. at 444.
15. Id. at 454.
16. Id. at 455.
17. Id. at 452.
18. Id. at 456 (citing Barton v. State, 67 Ga. 653 (Ga. 1881)).
19. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
20. Id. at 340-41.
21. Id. at 339.
22. Id. at 346-47.
23. Id. at 346.
24. WAYNE R. LAFAvE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1093 (West Group ed., West Publishing 3d ed.
2000).
25. Allen, 397 U.S. at 346.
26. Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17 (1973).
Vol. 12
4
Barry Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 4
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol12/iss1/4
Trial in Absentia
in absentia. Taylor claimed that his mere voluntary absence could not be construed
as an effective waiver of his right to be present during trial, unless it was demon-
strated that he knew or had been warned that he had a right to be present and that
the trial would continue in his absence. 27 Under Rule 43 and Diaz, the Court con-
cluded that the defendant waived his right to be present by his voluntary absence. 
28
It is unbelievable, "that a defendant who flees from a courtroom in the midst of a
trial - where judge, jury, witnesses and lawyers are present and ready to continue -
would not know that as a consequence the trial could continue in his absence.
29
As a consequence of the defendant's actions, the implicit waiver of his right to be
present was set forth.
The language used by the Court referring to the waiver of a right was sup-
ported by Johnson v. Zerbst,30 which explains the two elements of a waiver of fun-
damental constitutional rights: intention of relinquishment or abandonment and,
knowing that the person has a right or privilege. 31 The waiver must be intelligent
and competent.32 The federal courts of appeal moved forward to the possibility of
trying a person in absentia even though he had been absent from the beginning of
the trial. In United States v. Tortora,33 the Second Circuit court of appeals upheld
the holding that if a defendant had plead to the charges against him and knew that
the trial was to begin on a certain day but failed to appear without sound reason,
then he had waived his constitutional right to be present, knowingly and voluntari-
ly, so the trial could start in his absence. Pleading to the charges was essential in
Tortora because it was clear that the defendant had been advised when the pro-
ceedings were to commence.34 Furthermore, there was no element to justify his
failure to appear.35 Thus, it was without question that his absence was voluntary
and knowing.36
In addition, the court invoked the policy that underlies the precedents on the
subject by expressing that there was a public interest demanding that criminal pro-
ceedings be prosecuted with dispatch.37 However, the court went further on this
issue and stated another element to determine when the trial judge should exercise
his discretion to proceed with the trial: "[w]hen the public interest clearly out-
weighs that of the voluntarily absent defendant., 38 This "public interest" is a com-
plex of issues and includes:
[T]he likelihood that the trial could soon take place with the defen-
dant present; the difficulty of rescheduling, particularly in mul-
27. Id. at 19.
28. Id. at 20.
29. Id.
30. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
31. Id. at 464 (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 464-65.
33. Tortora, 464 F.2d 1202.
34. Id. at 1208.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1209.
37. Id. (citing Allen, 397 U.S. at 349 (Brennan, J., concurring)).
38. Id. at 1210.
Spring 2009
5
: Trial in Absentia
Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2009
Barry Law Review
tiple-defendant trials; the burden on the Government in having to
undertake two trials, again particularly in multiple-defendant trials
where the evidence against the defendants is often overlapping and
more than one trial might keep the Government's witnesses in sub-
stantial jeopardy.39
Indeed the court explained that it was difficult to conceive this exercise of dis-
cretion other than in a multiple-defendant case.40 Thus, the "Tortora test" is com-
posed of two prongs: 1) whether or not the defendant waived voluntarily and kno-
wingly his constitutional right to be present at trial; and 2) whether or not there is
any public interest that advises starting with the trial even though he is not
present.41
A. What has been Considered Sufficient to Constitute "Public Necessity"?
As stated before, this paper will focus on the second prong of the Tortora anal-
ysis, in order to determine and classify what has been considered sufficient "public
interest" to justify a trial in absentia. Material about what can be considered a
waiver of the right to be present can be found in the United States Code Anno-
tated42 .
1. The "Public Necessity" Where the Defendant was Absent at the Beginning
of the Trial
The "public necessity" prong was applied in several opportunities to conduct
trials in absentia where the defendant was not present at the onset of the trial. In a
situation where the defendant did not appear at the appointed time of his trial, but
did appear later that day, offering no explanation for his absence, the court ruled
that this was a voluntary absence because he had been released on bond, and one of
the conditions was his voluntary appearance for trial.43 In addition, the defendant
had been served with a subpoena ordering him to appear in court. 44 This case was
decided in Government of the Virgin Islands v. Brown, where the court said that
there were no, "[t]alismanic properties which differentiate the commencement of a
trial from later stages".45 It quoted Tortora, only in relation to the possibility of
waiving the right to be present at the commencement of his trial.46 The court did
not say anything about the public necessity prong.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1210 n.7.
41. Id. at 1210.
42. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1651, 1654-57 (2006); U.S. CONST. Amend. VI.
43. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Brown, 507 F.2d 186 (3d Cir.1975).
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United States v. Peterson involved six defendants who had been jointly in-
dicted.48 All of the defendants were present and prepared for trial except one.
The court concluded that since the likelihood of defendant's speedy return was
remote because he was released on bond, and over twenty government witnesses
had been assembled, it would be prejudicial for the government to seek a conti-
nuance. 50 The court also pointed out that the government's chief witness and po-
tential accomplice in the crime had already proved to be recalcitrant, so a delay
would provide her with an additional opportunity to abscond.51 The fact of under-
taking two trials, or the substantial risk that delay might prejudice the govern-
52ment's case outweighed the interests of the voluntarily absent defendant.
United States v. Pastor involved a defendant who used his chronic angina pec-
toris as an excuse to frustrate and delay the commencement of his trial. 53 The de-
fendant's actions resulted in his trial starting without his presence.54 The court
took into account the fact that more than fifty veniremen had been called and kept
waiting at considerable trouble and expense, and that another courtroom had to be
borrowed by special arrangement for the selection of the jury, due to the small size
of the original one. 55 The court pointed out that in the event of a severance, the
government would have been obligated to try the case twice (which took 12 days of
trial), and that two of the government's witnesses were one elderly and an en-
feebled material witness. 56 The District Court judge had arranged her schedule and
time for the trial, and it was unlikely to find another case ready for immediate tri-
al. 57 Moreover, the court also mentioned that the co-defendant, Weiner, was en-
titled to proceed with trial rather than face the indefinite adjournment that would
probably have otherwise occurred.58
In a single defendant case, Wilson v. Harris, the court took into account, "[t]he
public interest in an orderly system of justice and conservation of judicial re-
sources" to continue with the trial.5 9 The defendant was in custody, but refused to
come to court the first day of trial. 60 The next day he was persuaded to attend, but
he claimed that the handcuffing, mandatory because of a state regulation when
defendants were en route from the courthouse detention room to the courtroom,
would violate his constitutional rights at the time that he fired his second assigned
attorney. 61 The court found that the defendant's behavior only attempted to disrupt
48. United States v. Peterson, 524 F.2d 167, 172 (4th Cir.1975).
49. Id. at 182-83.
50. Id. at 185-86.
51. Id. at 186.
52. Id.
53. United States v. Pastor, 557 F.2d 930, 937 (2d Cir.1977).
54. Id. at 937-38.




59. Wilson v. Harris, 595 F.2d 101, 104 (2d Cir.1979).
60. Id. at 103.
61. Id.
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the processes of justice, by one means or another, and chose to continue with the
trial.62
United States v. Benavides involved a situation where the jury was selected a
few weeks before trial.63 Although the two defendants were present during jury
selection and also when the trial judge instructed the jury to return for the trial on a
specific day, they failed to show up in court on that date. 64 The trial court contin-
ued the case overnight.65 When the defendants did not appear in court the next day,
the judge proceeded with the trial without them and without making any inquiry
into whether or not the trial could soon be rescheduled with the defendants in at-
tendance.66 The court followed Tortora's "complex of issues" and added a new
element: the inconvenience to jurors.67 Nevertheless, the appellate court vacated
the convictions on the grounds that other than the possibility of juror inconve-
nience, the record demonstrated no great difficulty in rescheduling the trial.68 In-
deed, there was no evidence indicating that a continuance would have unduly in-
convenienced any person who had actually been selected as a member of the jury.69
The government did not argue that it could not have produced its three witnesses
had the trial been rescheduled to a later date.7° Only these two people were
charged in this trial, so it was not a big multiple defendant case.71 Finally, there
was no suggestion that the government's witnesses would be jeopardized or un-
available if the trial was delayed for a short time.72
In United States v. Muzevsky, 73 the court once again extended the public neces-
sity prong to single defendant cases. 74 The court distinguished Muzevsky from Pe-
terson affirming that these cases did not compel a per se rule that single defendant
trials cannot proceed in a defendant's absence. 75 It noted that even when the diffi-
culty in rescheduling and the possibility of prejudice to the government and other
co-defendants is exacerbated in multiple defendant cases, the likelihood of the trial
soon taking place with the defendant present and the preservation of testimony are
more likely to be affected by circumstances other than the number of defendants.76
The reason to proceed with the trial was triggered by the court's concern that delay
would lead accomplices testifying against Muzevsky to change their testimony and
that the other witnesses, mostly transient hotel employees, would not be available
for a second trial.77 The court also considered that, at the time of the trial, no in-
62. Id. at 104.
63. United States v. Benavides, 596 F.2d 137, 138 (5th Cir. 1979).
64. Id.
65. Id.






72. Id.; United States v. Beltran-Nunez, 716 F.2d 287, 291 (5th Cir. 1983).
73. United States v. Muzevsky, 760 F.2d 83 (4th Cir. 1985).
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formation was available that would have allowed the court to predict if the defen-
dant would appear within a reasonable time.78
In United States v. Sanchez, the defendant failed to appear on the trial day,
even though he had been present during pre-trial conference when his trial date was
set. 79 In addition, his co-defendant was present for the trial.80 After a one-day con-
tinuance with notification to the defendant's attorney and the issuance of a bench
warrant for Sanchez, the district judge granted the government's application for
Sanchez to be tried in absentia. 81 The court stated that:
[I]n a case with more than one defendant, Sanchez waived his right
to be present by failing to appear without explanation and while on
bail; that some reasonable steps, including a one-day continuation
with notification to his attorney and the issuance of a bench war-
rant, were taken unsuccessfully in response to his non-appearance;
that there was no reason to believe that the trial could likely soon
be held with Sanchez present; and that severance would impose on
the Government the burden of prosecuting two separate trials that
would involve substantially the same evidence.
82
Although the trial was brief, it was not clear at the beginning that this would be
the case.83 Even assuming it was known to be brief beforehand, a severance would
have required the government to preserve records and other evidence and retain
witnesses for a possible second trial sometime in the indefinite future. 84 Moreover,
postponing the co-defendant's trial would have burdened both the government and
the co-defendant, who had his own right to a speedy trial. 85
In United States v. Burnett, one defendant was indicted with eight other indi-
viduals on several charges. 86 He attended a pre-trial conference where he was noti-
fied that there would be a final pre-trial conference and the date of the trial.87 Sub-
sequently, he left the community treatment center that he was attending and never
returned.88 At the time of the final pretrial conference he was still missing. 89 The
government moved for him to be tried in absentia and the trial court, after a hear-
ing, concluded that the defendant had waived his right to be present. 90 The court of
appeals upheld the lower court's decision to try the defendant in absentia on the
grounds that at the time of the hearing he was missing for more than three weeks,
78. Id. at 85.
79. United States v. Sanchez, 790 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1986).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 251.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Sanchez, 790 F.2d at 251.
86. United States v. Burnett, 961 F.2d 1579 (6th Cir. 1992).
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and there was no indication of where the defendant was located or when he would
be found.91 The other defendants were waiting and the government would have
been put to unnecessary expense had it been required to try the defendant separate-
ly.
92
2. The "Public Necessity" Element was also Followed in Cases Where the De-
fendant had Fled After the Commencement of Trial
The First Circuit considered in United States v. Lochan, that once voluntary
absence is found, a district court must determine whether a severance would be
nevertheless appropriate.93 Among the factors to consider are, "[t]he likelihood
that a joint trial could take place in the future with the absent defendant present, the
present codefendant's right to a speedy trial, the difficulty of rescheduling the trial,
and the burdens on the government and the court in running two trials where the
evidence is overlapping." 94 The court determined that the two defendants had been
properly joined under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(b) and that a second
trial of Lochan alone would duplicate the co-defendant's, including the same facts
and witnesses. 95 Also, it weighed the burden on the government, the court and the
jurors.
9 6
In United States v. Latham,97 the only defendant did not return to court for the
second day of his trial. 98 The U.S. Marshal's office was informed that defendant
had boarded an airplane bound for Chicago, and was expected to be in Chicago's
airport to connect with a flight leaving for Arkansas.99 Nevertheless, it was later
found that this information was false and the reason for defendant's absence was
cocaine intoxication. 1° The trial court denied the defense's motion for a conti-
nuance and a significant part of the trial was conducted in defendant's absence.'01
The court of appeals contemplated that among the factors to consider for a trial
court to proceed with a trial in absentia were the likelihood that a joint trial could
take place in the future with the absent defendant present, the present co-
defendant's right to a speedy trial, and the burdens on the government and the court
in running two trials where the evidence was overlapping. 102
However, the court of appeals did not find any public interest to proceed with
the trial in the defendant's absence. 103 Even if the airplane issue were true, therewas a high likelihood that the trial could soon take place with the defendant
91. Id. at 1580.
92. Id.
93. United States v. Lochan, 674 F.2d 960, 967 (1st Cir. 1982).
94. Id. at 967-68.
95. Id. at 968.
96. Id.
97. United States v. Latham, 874 F.2d 852 (1 st Cir. 1989).
98. Id. at 854.
99. Id. at 854-55.
100. Id. at 855.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 858.
103. Latham. 874 F.2d at 858-59.
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present. 104 The defendant could have been apprehended at Chicago's airport within
a few hours and returned for the trial. 105 In addition, the information received from
the airline company could have been checked almost immediately and the majority
of courts have waited much longer than one and a half hours before recommencing
the trial without the defendant. 0 6 What is more, the government had already pre-
sented its evidence. 0 7 Consequently, the "complex[ity] of issues" which must be
balanced even if the defendant was willingly absent, led to affirming that the dis-
trict court should not have proceeded with the trial in defendant's absence after a
short delay. 1
08
In United States v. Fontanez, the trial commenced and ran with the defendant
present. 1°9 Two days later, when jury deliberations had already initiated, the de-
fendant was taken into police custody due to a crime unrelated to that for which he
was being tried."l0 The jury requested a read-back of certain testimony, and the
trial court, over defense counsel's objection and against the government's advice,
allowed it, explaining that the defendant was "unavoidably detained"."' As the
jury was unable to reach a verdict, the court delivered a modified Allen charge,
without waiting for the defendant. 11
2
The court of appeals determined that defendant's custody lasted only a few
hours, in which the government had informed the judge that he would be available
shortly and, in fact, the defendant entered the courtroom at the time the jury was
exiting after the Allen charge." 3 As a consequence, there was no apparent likelih-
ood of a prolonged delay or need to reschedule. 114 The court also remarked that
since Fontanez was a lone defendant, none of the Tortora multiple defendant fac-
tors apply to this case. 115
In Polizzi v. United States, a trial also known as "the RICO megatrial", 116 thirty
five defendants were charged. 17 Defendant Polizzi contended on appeal constitu-
tional violations from the absence of any knowing and voluntary waiver of this
right to be present at trial during a five-week absence for medical-related rea-
sons. 118 As the trial lasted seventeen months, consumed approximately 265 trial
days, and involved the introduction of thousands of exhibits and the testimony of
more than 274 witnesses, the appellate court found that the district court had not
104. Id. at 859.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 855.
108. Id. at 860.
109. United States v. Fontanez, 878 F.2d 33, 34 (2d Cir. 1989).
110. Id.
Ill. Id.
112. Id. at 34-35 (citing Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896)). An Allen charge is a supplemental
jury instruction given by the court to encourage a deadlocked jury, after prolonged deliberations, to reach a ver-
dict. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 74 (8th ed. 2004).
113. Id. at 35.
114. Id.
115. Fontanez, 878 F.2d at 37.
116. Polizzi v. United States, 926 F.2d 1311, 1313 (2d Cir. 1991).
117. Id. at 1312.
118. Id. at 1318.
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abused its discretion in concluding that there was a public interest in continuing the
trial in defendant's absence. "19
B. A New Supreme Court's Decision: Crosby
The situation changed in 1993 when the Supreme Court held that Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 43 prohibited a trial in absentia of a defendant who was not
present at the beginning of a trial.120 In Crosby v. United States, the defendant pled
not guilty and was released on bail after promising to remain in the state. 121 He
attended pretrial conferences and hearings and was told of the date of his trial. 1
22
Nevertheless, he did not appear on that day nor could he be found. 123 After several
days of delay and fruitless search for the defendant, the trial court rescheduled the
date of the trial. 124 The court concluded that he had voluntarily waived his right,
and the public interest in proceeding with the trial in his absence outweighed his
interest in being present during the proceedings. 125 As a consequence, he was tried
and convicted in absentia. 1
26
The Supreme Court analyzed the defendant's claim strictly under Rule 43, de-
termining that its language, structure and logic, supported a straightforward inter-
pretation rejecting the possibility of trial in absentia. 127 The court emphasized the
express use of a limiting phrase in Rule 43, the fact that the rule was a restatement
of the existing law and the fact that case law since Diaz has allowed trials in absen-
tia only when the defendant was present at the beginning of the proceedings.
128
The decision affirmed that the distinction between flight before and flight in the
middle of the trial is logical, since the costs of suspending a proceeding already
under way would be greater than the cost of postponing a trial that has not yet be-
gun. 129 Moreover, the court highlighted the fact that the defendant's initial pres-
ence serves to assure that any waiver was indeed known. 1
30
The court was very careful to say that it was not analyzing the case under a
constitutional parameter but just under Rule 43.131 It left a door open that was used
later by the intermediate courts of appeals to decide cases arising from claims of
violation of the constitutional right to be present at trial. The question that arises is
what has changed and what has remained intact after Crosby. Is it still necessary to
have a "public interest" to proceed with a trial or is that requisite, the intention of
119. Id. at 1313, 1323.




124. Id. at 257.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 262.
128. Id. at 259-60.
129. Id. at 261.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 261-62.
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which was to expand the possibility of trying someone in absentia when the defen-
dant had not attended the commencement of the proceedings, also brushed aside?
According to some, in Crosby the Supreme Court unanimously invalidated
Tortora and its progeny, 132 defining that case as a "bombshell" that invalidated
more than twenty years of federal case law that allowed trial to commence against
absent defendants under many circumstances. 133 Nevertheless, subsequent deci-
sions have demonstrated the contrary, as it will be explained in the next section.
Not only is the Tortora analysis still being applied, but also trials in absentia where
the defendant is not present from the beginning are a possibility under the Constitu-
tion. Hence, the question here is whether or not Tortora is still a valid law. If the
answer is positive, it has to be explained to what extent it is valid law. In other
words, what are the requisites to try someone in absentia in the federal jurisdiction?
C. The Situation in the Federal Courts after Crosby
1. The "Public Necessity" was still Applied in Some Cases in Which the De-
fendant was Not Present at the Beginning of the Trial
United States v. Arias was a case involving three defendants, one of whom
failed to appear in court on the morning trial was to begin.134 After a recess the
trial proceeded. 135 The court of appeals reversed on the grounds of Crosby without136 1 37
further specifications, and remanded for a new trial. In Kirk v. Dutton, a case
about a habeas corpus petition, the court held that an obligation to provide a speedy
trial for six other co-defendants and that trial could not safely be conducted with
the defendant at large and untried, was sufficient ground to start the trial without
one defendant.
In United States v. Deeb, the court extended Crosby's protection concluding
that a waiver of being present did not include a waiver of a right recognized by
statute to cross-examine witnesses against the defendant in the second trial. 138 In a
seven defendant indictment, one of the defendants, Deeb, failed to appear at trial on
the date scheduled. 139 The district court severed the charges and proceeded with
the trial against the remaining defendants.'4° Neither Deeb nor his attorney were
present at that trial. 14 1 Seven months later, Deeb was apprehended and the gov-
ernment disclosed that one of the defendants who had agreed to cooperate was ter-
132. Christopher T. Igielsky, Washington Defendant's New Right of Pre-Trial Flight, 19 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 633, 641 (Spring 1996).
133. Id. at 643.
134. United States v. Arias, 984 F.2d 1139, 1141 (11 th Cit. 1993).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1141-42.
137. Kirk v. Dutton, 38 F.3d 1216 (6th Cir.1994).
138. United States v. Deeb, 13 F.3d 1532, 1535-36 (11 th Cir. 1994), aff'g on other grounds, 987 F.2d 773
( lIth Cir. 1993).
139. Id. at 1533-34.
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minally ill with AIDS, and was suffering progressive memory deterioration. 142 The
court authorized the witness' deposition on videotape for the purpose of introduc-
ing the tape at Deeb's trial. 43 During Deeb's trial, the government showed the
videotape which included direct examination of the witness to the "ury.14 Cross-
examination was not requested by either the government or Deeb. 15 Under Cros-
by, the court affirmed that it would be impossible to impute to a defendant the
knowledge that by fleeing before trial, he had waived his right recognized by Rule
804(b)(1) to cross-examine the witnesses against him.' 46 In a footnote, the court
remarked its refusal to express any opinion if the defendant had fled to gain a stra-
tegic advantage from the death of an ailing witness. 147
United States v. Nichols148 was a single defendant case where the defendant
was in custody and appeared in court for jury selection but refused to attend after-
wards. Later, during one government witness's testimony, the defendant stood up
causing the court to call a recess. 149 The court found that if a defendant has en-
gaged in "stonewalling and other misconduct" or if there is no reasonable likelih-
ood that the trial could soon proceed with the defendant present, this is sufficient
justification to proceed with trial in the defendant's absence. 150 This requisite was
satisfied because the defendant was defiant and uncooperative, and his only expla-
nation for his nonattendance was indifference to and disdain for the proceedings. 151
2. The "Public Necessity" was Followed in Many Cases in which the Defen-
dant Fled During the Trial
In the five defendant case United States v. Davis, defendant McBride attended
the first week of trial but he checked into the emergency room of a hospital as a
result of ingesting fifty antidepressant pills and could not continue to attend in the
courtroom. 152 Following the Benavides test, a test similar to Tortora, but used for
single defendant cases, the court concluded that the burden of having to indefinite-
ly postpone or possibly retry this trial with numerous out-of-state witnesses and a
district-wide jury clearly outweighed the defendant's non-existent or feeble excuse
for declining to attend the trial.'
15
In United States v. Bradford, the court held that a consideration of the relevant
factors, including the defendant's contumacious conduct, in certain circumstances





146. Id. at 1535-36.
147. Id. at 1536, n. 1.




152. United States v. Davis, 61 F.3d 291, 300 (5th Cir. 1995).
153. Id. at 303.
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case. 154 Specifically, it considered that the defendant had refused to attend court
twice before, the first time being the original trial date when a jury venire had been
impaneled at a cost of $2,000.155 This time, a second jury venire had been impa-
neled and a jury selected, which was waiting to fulfill its obligations. 56 In addition,
both the government and the defense had witnesses who would have been greatly
inconvenienced by a sudden postponement. '57 The court also considered the nature
of the charges against the defendant, two counts of assaulting federal corrections
officers,158 and the safety of others in the courtroom when concluding that the deci-
sion to proceed with a trial in absentia was correct. 
159
United States v. Edwards involved a long, complex trial against the former
governor of Louisiana, his son, and several of his associates. 160 One of the defen-
dants suffered cardiac problems, but refused any severance of mistrial, in order to
permit him to undergo surgery because he believed it was in his best strategic in-
terest to proceed with the trial along with the rest of the defendants, particularly
Edwards. 161 Finally, an operation was performed and the government moved for
trial in absentia which was granted. 162 The court denied the defendant's motion for
mistrial but offered certain accommodations, which, among others, included audio,
video, or computer communication, having a nurse present at all times to monitor
Johnson's blood pressure and check on his overall health, as well as instituting
longer and more frequent breaks in the trial. 163 Johnson did not return to court until
after the jury delivered its verdict. 164 The court of appeals affirmed the judgment
on the basis that the trial was entering its third month and that the burdens on the
witnesses, jurors, defendants and the district court far exceeded the public interest
in postponing the proceedings or conducting a separate trial with Johnson
present.1
65
D. The "Public Necessity" in the Case Law
According to the precedents mentioned, the public necessity prong was in-
voked to decide whether or not it was convenient to proceed with the trial when the
defendant was not present, either when he assisted at the beginning of the trial or
when he never attended the first day. Public necessity exists in three particular
instances. First, if there is burden on the other participants in the trial. For the gov-
154. United States v. Bradford, 237 F.3d 1306, 1314 (1 1th Cir. 2001).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1314, n.1 1 (one Government witnesses was a single mother from California who would need
advanced notice of when she would need to be present in order to arrange for the care of her young children and
one of defense witnesses was recovering from medical problems).
158. Id. at 1307.
159. Id. at 1314.
160. United States v. Edwards, 303 F.3d 606 (5th Cir. 2002).
161. Id. at 624-25.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 626.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 629.
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ernment this means preserving the evidence until a new trial is possible, the risk of
the evidence losing efficiency due to passage of time, eventual unavailability of
witnesses, and unnecessary repetition of the trial. For the jurors and witnesses, the
burden consists of a waste of time and any inconvenience to assist to the trial (i.e.,
because they live far away from the court). For the court, the burden lies in diffi-
culties in rescheduling the trial (because of a busy agenda or even the unavailabili-
ty of a courtroom), concerns about the docket and the expenses of ordering a new
trial.
Second, co-defendant's right to a speedy trial (obviously only for multiple de-
fendant cases). Finally, the likelihood that the trial takes place soon with defen-
dant's presence. Indeed, the likelihood of a new trial with defendant's presence
has been considered the most important element and those cases where the courts
have vacated decisions to proceed with the trial despite defendant's absence were
concerned about the lack of this likelihood. Many situations have been considered
to be a burden on the other parties on the trial, and the list is not exhaustive.
V. WHAT HAPPENED TO THE "PUBLIC NECESSITY" PRONG?
Any appreciation of the role of a so-called "balancing test" according to the
Constitution demands a determination of what constitutional clauses are involved
in the right to be present at trial or, in other words, what rights may be affected by a
trial conducted without the defendant's presence. What Crosby did not resolve was
the key issue concerning trials in absentia; the constitutional possibility to try
someone who has never appeared at his trial because he wanted to prevent the pro-
ceedings from continuing.' 66 The holding in this case was based only on Rule 43,
and the court expressly stated that it did not, "[r]each Crosby's claim that his trial
in absentia was also prohibited by the Constitution.'
' 67
Generally, courts have found the right to be present in both the confrontation
clause of the Sixth Amendment and in the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.1 68 The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guaran-
tees, inter alia, the right of an accused, "[t]o be confronted with the witnesses
against him."169 A few tribunals have also upheld the right to be present included
in the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court considered
in Hopt v. Utah that if in a capital case the defendant is deprived of his life or liber-
ty without being present, such deprivation would be without the due process of law
required by the Constitution. 170 The holding was reiterated in Snyder v. Massachu-
setts,'7' Faretta v. Califorina172, United States v. Gagnon,73 and Kentucky v. Stinc-
166. However there are cases in which the defendant's absence may be used as a defense against racial bias
in the jury. In these cases the defendant may prefer to remain anonymous throughout the trial. See Current Devel-
opment 2004-2005 Trumping The Race Card: Permitting Criminal Defendants to Remain Anonymous and Absent
From Trial To Eliminate Racial Jury Bias, 18 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1151 (2005).
167. Crosby, 506 U.S. at 262.
168. Allen, 397 U.S. at 338.
169. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
170. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884).
171. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1934).
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er.174 These cases involved the defendant's presence during a pre-screening of a
jury venire, sidebar discussions with jurors during voir dire or challenges of jurors.
According to Finney v. Rothgerber, it is immaterial whether this right flows
from the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation or the Fifth Amendment guaran-
tee of due process. 175 In any case, the right exists in state felony trials by virtue of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 176  Others affirmed that the constitutional right is
rooted in both due process and confrontation clauses. 1
77
Since Diaz, the first Supreme Court case involving trial in absentia in a non-
capital case, the rule has been that the Constitution grants the defendant only the
opportunity to confront the witnesses against him, but if he refuses that privilege,
he cannot insist on it later. 178 As long as this chance is sufficiently guaranteed,
there is no necessity under the Constitution to give any different protection based
upon absconding either at the commencement of the trial or during it.
Even before Crosby, some courts had recognized that the right to be present
under Rule 43, "[i]s broader than the confrontation protection of the sixth amend-
ment.', 179 The federal courts of appeals have still been applying Tortora and Bena-
vides to allow trials when the person was not present from the beginning, but have
refused to continue applying the balancing test alleging that it was not a constitu-
tional requisite but a procedural rule to govern the trial court's exercise of its dis-
cretion. 180
Of course, all these cases involved federal habeas petitions rather than direct
appeals from a criminal conviction; as such only deprivations of federal rights
could be raised. 181 In all of them the question involved only a constitutional claim.
Considering that the courts of appeals have had the opportunity to address the issue
of whether a trial in absentia is possible under the Constitution, they have given the
step that the Supreme Court could not: "[n]othing in the Constitution prohibits a
trial from being commenced in the defendant's absence as long as the defendant
knowingly and voluntarily waives his right to be present."'
' 82
VI. "PUBLIC NECESSITY" IS NECESSARY
Notwithstanding the arguments presented so far to support trials in absentia,
there are still many good reasons to consider that it is preferable to have a trial with
the defendant present rather than without him. "It is obviously desirable that a
172. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 896, 819 n.15 (1975).
173. United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526-27 (1985).
174. Kentucky v. Stincer, 82 U.S. 730, 745 (1987).
175. Finney v. Rothgerber, 751 F.2d 858 (6th Cir.1985).
176. Id. at 862.
177. Latham, 874 F.2d at 856; Fontanez, 878 F.2d at 35; United States v. Reiter, 897 F.2d 639, 642 (2d Cir.
1990).
178. See Diaz, 233 U.S. at 253.
179. United States v. Alikpo, 944 F.2d 206, 209 (5th Cir.1991); Clark v. Scott, 70 F.3d 386, 390 n.6 (5th
Cir.1995).
180. Scott, 70 F.3d at 390 n.7; Smith v. Mann, 173 F.3d 73, 76 (2d Cir.1999).
181. Headley v. Tilgham, 53 F.3d 472,474 (2d Cir.1995).
182. Mann, 173 F.3d at 76.
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defendant be present at his own trial.' 8 3 The best way to demonstrate that nothing
suspicious happens during a trial is to have people present, in order to listen to the
witnesses and understand the evidence that supports a conviction. This is also true
for the defendant, the most interested person in a transparent trial. When the de-
fendant is in the courtroom during his trial, he can see what is going on and partici-
pate in it. Cohen has explained the defendant's interest in being present during the
trial as being: to prevent any coercion into waiving his right; 184 to prevent any pre-
judicial inference from his absence by the jury; 185 to let the jury observe him,
which can be beneficial to his interests;' 86 and because he plays an important role
as a member of the defense team.
187
It is clear according to the cases mentioned above that the Constitution does
not require the defendant's presence during a trial. It is possible to try him without
his presence, either when he is absent from the beginning of the trial or when he
fails to appear on a subsequent day. Thus, even when the judiciary only has to
consider that extreme, it would be advisable to include the 'balancing test' in order
to prevent any arbitrary application. The negative effects that a trial in absentia
supposedly tends to neutralize would be reinforced if the trial was wrongly con-
ducted in absentia and afterwards a court of appeals vacated the conviction on that
ground. Evidently, the penological purposes of the punishment would be seriously
weakened if a prison term were imposed a considerable time after the offense as a
consequence of an appeal process and a new trial. In addition, the evidence that
supports an accusation or a defense would be gravely undermined for a new trial if
the previous one was erroneously conducted in absentia. Witnesses would be more
difficult to find or their memory probably would not be as precise as it had been
during the former trial. In order to prevent these undesired effects, the trial should
only proceed when it is absolutely necessary. In other words, it would continue
only under extraordinary circumstances in which, "[t]he public interest clearly
outweighs that of the voluntarily absent defendant."
' 188
It would be better if the statute or rule provided a 'public necessity' require-
ment for the trial in absentia instead of focusing on the distinction between ab-
sconding before or after the commencement of the trial. As a matter of fact, the
arguments evoked by the Supreme Court in Crosby are far from unquestioned: 1) it
is not certain that the cost of suspending a proceeding already under way will be
greater than the costs of postponing a trial that has not yet begun; 2) there are many
other situations other than the defendant's initial presence that can serve to assure
that the waiver was indeed done knowingly (i.e., arraignment); and 3) the option of
gambling on an acquittal when the defendant knows that the verdict will go against
him also exists prior to the beginning of the trial proceedings since the defendant
knows the evidence against him before entering the courtroom.
183. Tortora, 464 F.2d at 1210.
184. Cohen, supra note 4, at 180.
185. Id. at 181.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Tortora, 464 F.2d at 1210.
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One way to keep the confidence of the people in its legal system is by conduct-
ing criminal trials as quickly as possible. As a principle, a defendant cannot decide
the date and time of his trial, nor can he manipulate it in order to avoid being tried
or to postpone it without sound reason. However, one legal tool that defendants
have to manipulate their trials is by absconding before the commencement, because
the federal rule and the case law forbid continuing with a trial if the defendant was
not present at the beginning.
On the other hand, the United States Constitution does not go that far and only
requires the possibility that the defendant confront the witnesses against him. This
right can be waived as long as it was a voluntary and knowing waiver. Neverthe-
less, an abuse of trials without the defendant's presence or an arbitrary application
of the trial in absentia can also undermine the principles supposedly safeguarded by
a trial in absentia-the confidence of the people in the judicial system. For this rea-
son, it is advisable to consider the "balancing test" which, in addition to a defen-
dant's voluntary and knowing waiver of his right to be present, takes into account
the "public interest" to continue with the proceedings of the trial.
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